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Since the late 1980s, political scientists, donors, and development workers in East and
Southern Africa have devoted much time and resources to the question of ‘democratization’.
Yet, it is not clear how this concept of ‘democratization’ has helped us to understand African
politics or if donor support for ‘democratization’ has been successful.  There are both
methodological and conceptual problems with the way democratization is used to explain
processes as varied as the de-racialization of South Africa, the post-civil war effort to rebuild
Mozambique, and the different patterns of change to multi-party politics in Kenya, Zambia
and Malawi. 
Many accounts of these processes of democratizations are ahistorical, or
decontextualised from the historical and cultural situations.  Secondly, i stitutions which are
thought to enable democratizations – like churches and NGOs – are poorly understood and
little studied.  Assumptions, rather than empirical evidence, dominate.  Such partial
understandings of the societies and institutions under observation leads to inappropriate
policy responses by bilateral and multi-lateral donors eager to support ‘democratization’.
In this paper, I explore the ways in which the development industry has adopted and
used  political science concepts of ‘democratization’ and ‘civil society’ and the problems
inherent with this process.  I focus on the role of local or ‘indigenous’ NGOs as recipients of
donor aid and potential agents of democratization.  In order to understand why NGOs are
assumed to contribute to a process of  ‘democratization’ we need to examine both what
donors think NGOs are, and their relationship with the state, as well as how this plays out in
practice. In particular, we need to examine the changes that have resulted from the increased
resources made available to the NGO sector.  A case study of a prominent Zimbabwean
Human Rights NGO, ZimRights, will be used to illustrate the problems caused by growth and
expansion.  First however, I want to examine the methodology and conceptualization of
‘democracy’ as used by donors.
I. Methodological Issues
Studies of NGOs in Africa are usually based on interview research focussing on a wide
number of organizations within a particular sector.2   Zimbabwean NGOs are amongst the
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most studied, but these studies still conform to this tendency.3  This method prevents detailed
study of individual NGOs.  It becomes less easy to interrogate certain aspects of NGO
behaviour, such as internal decision-making. Neither the history of the NGO,  how it interacts
with the history of the country or region, nor the people within the NGO are examined,
except as background detail.   Thick description of how NGOs functioned is sidelined in the
interest of labelling and categorizing them.
Methodology has to some extent been dictated by the research agenda of donors and
international institutions. In the 1980s, official aid was increasingly channelled not to
bilateral partners, but through northern NGOs to local communities or local NGOs.4  Local
NGOs were seen in the 1980s and 1990s as ‘apolitical’ development organizations.  As a
result of this emphasis, most early studies of NGOs  were undertaken for donors with
particular sets of questions,  such as how well NGOs ‘fit’ demands set before them, with
respect to their efficiency, participation levels, and transparency,  although Tvedt argues that
these values are actually rarely measured.5    Within this agenda, NGOs were  understood to
be engaged in technical development practices such as health provision, rural development or
poverty-reduction.6 The interview methodology, with its emphasis on data collection, met the
donor’s need to assess their expenditures.  It failed to position NGOs within a more political
or historical setting, and to explain how they relate to the state, donors, and each other.
This decontextualization became problematic  as donors and researchers took on the
idea that NGOs might also contribute to expanding good governance and democratization.
The landmark 1989 World Bank report, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable
growth called for economic reforms to “go hand-in-hand with good governance.”7  As part of
what came to be known as the ‘governance ag nda,’  NGOs were expected to go beyond
being service providers and become active participants in policy-making.8  NGOs and civil
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Organizations of Developing Countries: And the South Smiles (Dordrecht: Novib/Nijhoff, 1992), chapter 21:
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society were integrated into previously apolitical conceptions of human development.9
Development organizations were to be ‘turned into’ activist or advocacy organizations:
“financing NGOs in Africa as potential agents of democracy should be at the top of donor
agendas in the 1990s.”10  While interview and survey-based research helps explore what
NGOs are doing, it is less useful in explaining why or how they become (or don’t become)
involved in democratization-related activities.11  In order to do this, I propose that we need to
study NGOs from inside, using techniques such as participant-observation that enable us to
create detailed, descriptive case studies.  This methodology has the benefit of positioning
NGOs more clearly against the political backdrop of the country and the institutional history
of the organization studied.
II. Democratization = Civil Society = NGOs?
The dominant thinking about democratization in Africa – and especially that which has
contributed to policy and aid decisions by western donors – has focused around what Gordon
White called  a “developmental panacea” – the issue of “strengthening civil society.”12  Civil
society is cited as the “missing key to sustained political reform”13 and is often
operationalized as non-governmental organizations.  Thomas Carothers’ useful account of
American promotion of democracy abroad notes that:
the current keen interest in this... almost forgotten concept was stimulated by
the dissident movements in Eastern Europe in the 1980s [which] fostered the
appealing idea of civil society as a domain that is nonviolent but powerful,
nonpartisan yet prodemocratic, and that emerges from the essence of particular
societies, yet is nonetheless universal.14
Civil society is understood as formally organized groups, ideally with democratic structures
and pro-democratic norms.15  For aid bureaucrats, supporting civil society was a low-cost
alternative to unsuccessful and expensive attempts to reform state institutions.16  The
practical difficulties of funding grass-roots organizations means that most donor-support goes
to “...professionalized NGOs dedicated to advocacy or civic education.”17    These groups are
visible and accessible.  With university educated staff, it is relatively easy for them to interact
with donors and provide the desired skills of accounting and report-writing.
                                             
9  UNDP. Human Development Report 1992 ((New York: OUP, 1992), 26-27.
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11  For example, Sam Moyo, Non-governmental Organisations in Zimbabwe: Context, Role and Relationships
Working Paper December 1990; Sam Moyo, NGO Advocacy in Zimbabwe: Systematising an Old Function or
Inventing a New Role?  Harare: ZERO, 1992; Sam Moyo, “Towards and Understanding of Zimbabwean NGOs”
Paper prepared for the NANGO/MWENGO Self-Understanding Workshop, November 1995; Alan Thomas,
“Does Democracy Matter? Pointers from a comparison of NGOs influence on environmental policies in
Zimbabwe and Botswana” Open University DPP Working paper 31; GECOU Working paper 4. June 1995.
12  Gordon White, “Civil society, democratization and development” in Robin Luckham and Gordon White,
Democratization in the south: the jagged wave (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).
13  John W Harbeson, “Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa” in John W Harbeson, Donald
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Politics 36, 2 (1998), 6-7 .
16  Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 157-206.
17 Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, “The Burgeoning World of Civil Society Aid” in Marina Ottaway
and Thomas Carothers eds.  Funding Virtue: civil society and democracy promotion (Washington, DC:
Carnegie, 2000), 11; See also, Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 210-211.
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Normatively and programmatically, civil society is advocated by the development
community and donors who propose that funding civil society (i.e. support to non-state
sectors) is both an end in itself and a means to an end of democratic governance.    Carothers
and Ottaway’s critical examination of  donor funding states:
In the eyes of many donors and recipients, and even of many democratic
theorists, the idea that civil society is always a positive force for democracy,
indeed even the most important one, is unassailable.  An active – ‘vibrant’ is
the adjective of choice – civil society is both the force that can hold
governments accountable and the base upon which a truly democratic culture
can be built.  There follows from this assumption the related idea that
promoting civil society development is key to democracy-building.18
The Ford Foundation, for example, has a unit dedicated to “Governance and Civil Society”
whose goal is “to strengthen the civic and political participation of people and groups in
charting the future of their societies.”19  The official American development agency,  USAID,
funds “civil society organizations” as one of its four democracy sectors because:
The hallmark of a free society is the  ability of individuals to associate with
like-minded individuals, express their  views publicly, openly debate public
policy, and petition their government. ‘Civil society’ is an increasingly
accepted term which best describes the non-governmental, not-for-profit,
independent nature of this segment of society.20
Similarly, Sweden’s International Development Agency explicitly states that Sweden funds
NGOs because of:
....its aim of contributing to democratic development of society. A large
number of  organisations which, between them, represent various interests and
parties is viewed as  a guarantee of democracy. 21
Activists in the developing and developed world echo this usage and there has been a
remarkable consensus within development and aid circles across sectors and ideologies:
Neo-populist development theorists and practitioners extol the virtues of
grass-roots non-governmental organizations....Economic liberals [emphasize]
how these policies contribute to the emergence of business interests to
counter-balance and discipline way-ward states.  Treasury-based cost-cutters
see devolution of government finance to voluntary organisations as an
ideologically palatable way of reducing state expenditure. Conservative
thinkers see it as a way of preserving traditional social solidarities...Radical
socialists zero in on the potential role of social organizations...in transforming
society.22
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However, it also became clear to academics and practitioners that NGOs may lack the
capacity to ‘bring democratization’, carry out advocacy activities, or ‘build civil society’ and
tend instead towards ‘gapfilling’ or supplementing the state’s agenda.  On one level, this
merely recognizes that most NGOs in developing countries are dedicated to the provision of
development goods, often in co-operation with government ministries.  NGOs are encouraged
to go beyond this sort of gap-filling, to “...take a more pro-active, empowerment role towards
democracy and development in Africa.”23   “Strengthening civil society” is declared to be a “
deliberately designed and targeted activity of aid.”24  As a result, development NGOs are
increasingly funded to ‘network’ and ‘develop civil society’ in addition to their more
mundane development tasks.
These ‘capacity critiques’ propose that while NGOs don’t do advocacy very well,
they can be funded to do so.  Donors assume that the problem is how to  programme, fund,
organize or otherwise catalyze democratic or participatory structures. The ready-made
assumption is that NGOs want to engage in advocacy work, but merely lack the resources to
do so.  Questions of attitude or viability are rarely raised.
Like welfare organizations, churches, and informal markets, NGOs were ‘discovered’
by academics and donors disenchanted with the state in the 1980s.25 In a rush of enthusiasm,
the origins of these non-state organizations or what influences accounted for their formation,
their policy goals, their activities were little studied.  As Kassimir notes in relation to
churches, civil society approaches “decid[ed] in advance that civil organisations are
principally independent variables and assign[ed] them a role rather than analysing it.”26   This
holds also for NGOs.  Clark, for instance, talks of NGOs “overcoming their inhibitions and
seeking closer collaboration with their governments.”27   NGOs which get too close to their
own states are ‘co-opted’— no longer ‘real’ NGOs nor part of civil society but ‘defined out’
because they do not fit pre-defined notions.28  In proposing that we must distinguish between
‘true’ and ‘false’ NGOs, Clark demands that organizations fit the definitions of donors and
researchers, rather than vice-versa.29 Our research should instead ask questions such as:  Who
works for NGOs? Why? What ideological or moral convictions do they have?
The NGO literature seems to assume that NGOs spring into being fully-formed and
without political ties or links, unless they are run by civil servants, MPs or Presidential wives
in which case they are pathologized as Government-NGOs (GONGOs). Yet, in reality, NGO-
state relations are better understood as a continuum.  NGOs may have cabinet ministers as
board members; staff members may be related to government officials; the President or first-
lady may be a patron.  NGOs which challenge the state at the local level may have excellent
relations at the centre, or vice-versa. Linkages exist between all NGOs and power-brokers
which change over time, and differing relations may exist with different levels of the state.
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These linkages are often enhanced by material but also by cultural and social
connections between élites, as NGO staff often come from or seek to join the same relatively
small bourgeoisie.  NGOs may use their personal connections with politicians and civil
servants to increase their profile and enhance  their ability to accomplish their goals.  School
ties, church adherence, and time spent in exile, in the liberation movements, or in prison may
all link NGO staff and politicians.  They  may also receive or be keen to receive funding from
the state.30
III. Problematizing Voluntarism and Professionalization
The NGO sector is presumed to be based on the Tocquevillean principles of voluntary action
and charitable assistance.  However, the majority of NGOs do not operate on voluntary
principles.  Indeed, ‘voluntary association’ as the term was originally used to describe
African colonial-era institutions was based on a distinction between traditional ascriptive
associations and new, often urban, organizations which included churches, savings groups,
burial societies, and sports clubs.  As Wallerstein noted, they are “‘voluntary’ in that no one’s
membership was fore-ordained at birth, or automatic.”31
Donors and policy-makers are rarely explicit about how exactly the ‘voluntary sector’
promotes democracy.  Michael Bratton has elucidated these points in some detail.  At the risk
of making a straw-person of his argument, I will take his contribution to the influential Carter
Centre report on Governance to illustrate ideas that often remain implicit in donor discourses.
On an institutional level, it is assumed that encouraging NGOs to do advocacy and
policy-related work strengthens ‘civil society’ by  providing  “alternative structures to the
monopolies of the state.....voluntary organizations can empower like-minded members to
articulate a collective interest and take collective action.”32   A more ‘indirect’ route to
democracy-enhancement presumes that the interactions of the voluntary sector lead to the
natural development of a vocal society, in what Carothers has called “the benevolent
Tocquevillean vision underlying US assistance to civil society....”33  To quote Bratton again,
“voluntary organizations can promote a democratic political culture....they offer a training
ground for democratic practices of governance.”34   These ideas were  further reinforced by
the publicity surrounding the 1993 publication of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work
which advocated the importance of ‘civic’ associations for the consolidation of democracy.35
Civil society theory, as implemented by donors, is predicated on the assumption that
voluntary organizations have the capacity and desire to both m bilize and socialize their
members and the wider society.36  Voluntary organizations are reified in this construction
because their voluntary nature is the key to socialization, while their membership is presumed
to be available for mobilization.  Donors and others endeavouring to strengthen civil society
have increasingly used this justification for channelling funds into the NGO sector.
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lessons” Economist 6 February 1993.
36 Ronald Kassimir, “The Social Power of Religious Organisation and Civil Society: the Catholic Church in
Uganda” in Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 36, 2 (1998), 56.
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But is it really this straight-forward?   Are NGOs necessarily based on voluntary
action?  The increased funding, in particular, further complicates these assumptions.  With
access to large amounts of donor funding NGOs become ‘professionalized,’ functioning
instead as implementing agencies:
With increased funding has come increased demands for accountability,
professionalism, and demonstrated impact of activities.  As a result, many
NGOs have begun to transform themselves, reducing the voluntary part of
their activities in favour of staff being trained as professionals and having
explicit professional qualifications.37
The implications of this shift from voluntary to professional staff can be profound, but has
not yet been taken account of by donor agencies and mainstream researchers.  An ODA
report which engages specifically with the issue of the impact of external funding and
professionalization on local NGOs considers only half of the problem. The researchers
recognize that NGOs are particularly vulnerable to internal crisis and personnel turn-over
after their first tranche of major funding.  In this case, professionalization is a trend in which
older, volunteer members are replaced by  younger, professional staff.38   However,
professionalization also occurs when members become the professionalized staff, a
particularly volatile combination where both the government and private sectors are less
attractive career options.  This group of staff not only feels ‘ownership’ of the organization,
but they are also seen as ‘professional’ experts – a potent and heady combination.
Impact of professionalization and growth on ZimRights
In the case of ZimRights, the growth of the organization and the steady progression of
members becoming staff led to very serious organizational conflicts, and the collapse of the
NGO.  An examination of the broader history, impact of donor funding and organizational
development of ZimRights helps us to understand the organization’s vulnerability to external
and internal challenges.
ZimRights was founded in 1992  by a group of prominent professionals and
activists.39    It was Zimbabwe’s only significant NGO dedicated explicitly  to  human rights
issues.  As such, it was perhaps inevitable that ZimRights was  both visible and controversial
within Zimbabwean politics.  Indeed, since its founding ZimRights has rarely been out of the
headlines, ironically, most often providing the story itself, rather than uncovering human
rights abuses.
ZimRights was both a membership organization and a professionally-run NGO.  Its
offices provided membership services and co-ordinated donor-funded programmes.  The
latter included projects run by the Education, Information and Legal departments.  The
Education department organized civic education workshops in peri-urban and rural areas.
The Information office, staffed by a steady stream of foreign interns, mainly issued press
releases and published the membership newsletters.  The Legal Desk, which came into being
in May 1996, gave legal advice to members and clients, as well as the organization. The
grass-roots of ZimRights were its estimated 14 000 members.  Membership  gave ZimRights
a particular cachet with donors, who want to work with grass-roots organizations.  Further,
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the existence of ZimRights’ members gave a certain weight to its pronouncements in the
press.  Yet a  membership survey which I carried out in 1997 suggested that most members
felt they had neither been adequately informed nor involved in the organization.40  Indeed,
membership lists, which would enable members to at least receive newsletters,  have tended
to be sketchy and addresses frequently incorrect.  Relatively few members ever actually
received the publications of the information desk.  The Gweru chair claimed that none of the
300 plus members of his branch ever received a ZimRights publication.41
In contrast, ZimRights’ élite is the Advisory Board  —  composed of well-known
public figures who lend prestige to the organization, such as  Sir Garfield Todd, the former
Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia,  Enoch Dumbutshena, a former Chief Justice,
Chenjerai Hove, the award-winning author, and Morgan Tsvangirai, the trade unionist.
Members were represented through a structure of regional committees, known as Regional
Councils, the chairs of which were automatically members of the National Council, the main
policy-making body, to which others were also elected  at the AGM.  Councils did not exist
consistently in all provinces, but have tended to reflect the existence of donor-funded
projects, which catalyze membership and organization.  Some regional councils were quite
actively involved in nationally-driven activities such as workshops and election-monitoring,
while others pursued local human rights cases brought to their attention.  In rural areas, some
regional council members were involved in complaints relating to land tenure, for instance
attempts to remove squatters, disputes over land ownership or water usage rights. More
recently, they also supported communities displaced by political violence.
In between the membership and the Advisory Board is the National Council which
used to oversee much of the day-to-day management of the organization, but since 1994 the
Executive Director and staff took on increased responsibilities and the Council met less
frequently.  This was a matter of regret for some older members who remembered the old
‘activist’ days fondly.  Inevitably there was been  conflict between Council and staff, as many
of the older members believe that they had more commitment to the issues than the new,
younger, staff.  Council members, especially those based in Harare or Bulawayo, did
continue to exercise some authority until 1996, as they sat on committees which supervised
particular areas or programmes. However, these ‘activist’ council members tended to demand
input into day to day management, leading to staff complaints of interference.  In reaction,
committees were abolished, except on an ‘ad-hoc’ basis, further reinforcing staff control over
decision-making.42
Many older council members – those who recall the ‘good old days’ – suggested that
the people employed by ZimRights were not ‘activists’ like those who started the
organization. The current staff were thought to be influenced by ‘nine-to-fiveism’ and
expected to be paid for the time they put in outside regular office hours, although this reflects
a wider attitude in the Zimbabwean NGO community, reinforced by the dire economic
situations of many.  However, ZimRights did not see a simple withering of the Council.
Former Council members formed the backbone of the secretariat as well — of the twenty-
four employees in 1997, six were former National Council members, and these were often in
particularly powerful positions within the organization.
As more staff were hired divisions between staff and membership became blurred.
When ZimRights was formed, all the staff of ZimRights were volunteers, who were paid
allowances and eventually given salaries.  Subsequently, ZimRights has expanded
immensely, moving from two part-time staff in 1993, to three full-time staff members in
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1994, to eight in 1995, eleven in 1996, twenty-four in 1997, and forty in 1998.   External
evaluators in 1997 recommended the decentralization of the secretariat which resulted in the
opening of regional offices all requiring their own staff.  This might have contributed to
ZimRights strengthening its membership base and diminishing the power of the Harare
central office, but at the same time it strengthened the Secretariat.
In addition to the six former National Council members who became staff members,
other positions were filled by ZimRights members and/or volunteers who turned voluntary
positions into paid ones.  While it is difficult to be conclusive, my research suggests that at
least half the secretariat from 1996 onwards were members or volunteers who had fundraised
and created full-time jobs for themselves.
Indeed, for some, being active in an NGO like ZimRights is only possible when
unemployed, but it is also seen as a ‘job’ in so far as it occupies one’s time, inspires respect
in the community, and brings in some remuneration.  It is not insignificant, perhaps, that a
listing of National Council members for 1999-2001 identifies 8 out of 20 as ‘unemployed’ –
although some of them might dispute this label, preferring to be described as self-employed
or retired.43  The saliency of this issue is most strongly revealed in the dependence on ‘per
diems’ given to members for attending meetings.  Theoretically, per diems cover out-of-
pocket expenses, recognizing that receipts are rarely available on informal-sector transport.
In reality, though, the money is an incentive to attend, or at least a reward for attending.  For
Harare based participants, 1997 AGM transport expenses were unlikely to have been higher
than ZWD 30 (USD3), for transport from most suburbs to the city centre, where transport
was organized to take delegates to the conference centre in an outlying suburb.  However, all
delegates received ZWD100.00 (USD10.00) attendance allowances per diem, which grew to
ZWD200 in later years.
Most ZimRights’ activities were organized by the staff and not the membership.  They
tended not to emphasize human rights per se – instead they resembled civic education and
legal aid projects run by other NGOs throughout the country.  While the membership
structures did channel some grass-roots concerns to the national level,  most staff were
occupied with relatively uncontroversial donor-funded ‘projects’.  Occasionally, the
ZimRights information office responded to current political events by issuing press releases.
While many of these were picked up by the government and independent media, reference to
particularly sensitive incidents provoked attack from the ruling party.
Within a month of its formation, ZimRights was forced to defend the inclusion on its
board of former Chief Justice Enoch Dumbutshena, denying any link with Dumbutshena’s
Forum for Democratic Reform Trust, which went on to become the Forum Party.44  And then,
at the official launch, Garfield Todd,  the former Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister,
attacked the state press, comparing their editors to the three monkeys who see no evil, hear no
evil and speak no evil.  In the racially charged environment, this was  interpreted in the worst
possible way by the state-controlled Sunday Mail: “Zimpapers editors are monkeys.”45  And,
in the same speech, he also criticized the decision to promote Per nce Shiri, former
commander of 5 Brigade, to Air Force Commander, which led to another acrimonious
exchange in the media, in which Defence Minister Moven Mahachi challenged Todd’s record
on human rights while Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.46   ZimRights was again
targeted in the official media in November 1995, in the aftermath of a rally protesting police
brutality.  While pursuing petty criminals,  police officers accidentally shot and killed three
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by-standers.  The protest march organized  by ZimRights, degenerated into rioting and
looting.  In an inflammatory speech, President Mugabe labeled ZimRights “ZimLooters” and
a “gangster organization.”  ZimRights denied that the rioting and looting had any link at all to
their protest, suggesting that the march had concluded and dispersed long before the riots, and
that ZANU(PF) youths were responsible for the violence.47
In 1996, ZimRights also came under attack in the government-controlled media, for
their support for a sustained and damaging strike by doctors and nurses.  ZimRights provided
the striking workers with sanctuary and access to telephones and faxes.  On their own front,
ZimRights issued several press releases to the media about the need to resolve the strike
issue, and in particular, appealed to MPs to find a solution, which led to a very critical
discussion of the issue in Parliament.48  ZimRights was attacked for this very visible and
public support of the nurses and doctors in both a Herald news story and an editorial, which
claimed that the strike was ‘hardly normal’ and alleged outside interference.  The editorial
claimed that ZimRights had been used as a conduit to transfer ZWD 2 million from ‘foreign
well-wishers’ to the nurses and doctors, although this was firmly denied.49
A more pro-active project was undertaken in 1996 when it was proposed that
ZimRights conduct research on the controversial and little-known human rights abuses in
Matabeleland with the intention of publishing a book. Although donor funding was
forthcoming, and the ZimRights leadership supported the book project, it was bogged down
in in-fighting and turf-disputes. The text was finalized by December 1996 by  May 1997, the
book was ready to go to the printers.  Publication was delayed for two years after the election
of a new National Council which demanded to read and consider the draft. Those with
personal knowledge of the Matabeleland conflict wanted their experiences included and were
concerned that it missed events they considered significant.  Eventually, the text was judged
to conform with the demands of the National Council, giving them a sense of ownership over
the project.  In February 1999, the book was again deemed ready for printing.  Publication
was delayed until October, however, because of controversies between staff and council
members about the title of the book and responsibility for the foreword.  In the end, the
Executive Director wrote a foreword and the book was released in October 1999 nearly two
years after its text was finalized.50  By this time, discussion of the  Matabeleland conflict  had
become less sensitive owing to widespread media discussion and the acceptance of
culpability by some party and army officials.
The Matabeleland book was probably the most controversial project undertaken by
ZimRights between 1992 and 1999.   The book was both a product and a victim of
ZimRights’ organizational culture.  The informality of ZimRights’ office life allowed an
American intern to get approval for the book from the Executive Director and Chairman:
Chimhini [the director] was initially very supportive because he wanted the
organization to be seen to be doing ‘serious work’ like other NGOs that
publish books and document abuses ... Matchaba-Hove [the chairman]
appeared to be most concerned about what the donors would think and how
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they would react...he did not want the project to jeopardise funding for the
organization by being too controversial, but once the donors lined up with
funding, then he showed some support.51
However, their commitment to the project was passive, because there were more potential
costs than benefits to such a controversial project and publication was easily delayed once the
newly elected Council members expressed concern.  The book’s eventual publication, with
which staff members credit Director David Chimhini, was probably influenced by donors
who wanted the organization to account for the expenditure of their funding.
As this account suggests, ZimRights did come under attack from the state and its
intelligence operatives, but it suffered more grievously from internal, personalized conflicts
arising from the blurred distinction between members and staff.  To date, these have been
little considered in accounts of ZimRights’ troubled history, which either ignore ZimRights
problems, or blame them all on malicious infiltration.52
ZimRights’ first Secretary-General was the former director of the Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) Nick debele, who, it is widely believed, had been
forced to resign from the CCJP in 1991 owing to accusations of financial mismanagement.53
These allegations made Ndebele an ambiguous figure, but many continued to respect his
championing the cause of those tortured and brutalized in Matabeleland in the 1980s.
Ndebele “...with no thought for his own safety, had traveled through the troubled areas of
Matabeleland and the Midlands interviewing people who had been the victims of
atrocities.”54  He did not escape unscathed.  As previously discussed, Ndebele was arrested
and detained under the Rhodesian-era Law and Order Maintenance Act.  He and his family
were also been traumatized during the conflict, in which several relatives were detained,
tortured or killed.55
In 1992, after serving as Secretary-General of ZimRights for only a few months,
Ndebele was replaced by Ozias Tungwarara, after further accusations of financial irregularity
– charges he always strenuously denied, but which were lodged by the highly respected
Zimbabwe Project, which had been providing offices and access to phones for ZimRights, as
well as ‘banking’ their monies.  They claimed that cash advances had been requested by
Ndebele, of which the Council had remained unaware.56  Ndebele later claimed that his
dismissal was because in 1992 he had again highlighted issues around the Matab leland
massacres— alleging that human remains found near a CIO building were linked to the
Matabeleland disappearances.57   Nevertheless, as a member of the organization, Ndebele
continued as chair of the human rights education committee, and, as we shall see,  was given
a full-time job organizing human rights education in 1994.
After this initial controversy, ZimRights grew gradually and relatively smoothly from
1993 until 1995 under Tungwarara’s leadership.  Programmes and budgets had expanded and
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ZimRights acquired new staff members and moved in 1995, from cramped city-centre offices
to a spacious, if somewhat run-down,  house on the outskirts of the Central Business District.
In the tenser political environment of 1995, which was an election year, ZimRights began to
feel they were being targeted by a ‘destabilization’ campaign, typified by Mugabe’s labelling
them “ZimLooters.”58  This feeling of attack intensified in late 1995 when a document was
circulated accusing Tungawarara of sexual misbehaviour.  ZimRights has always claimed that
this was planted by the CIO.  Despite support within the organization, he left soon afterwards.
He was replaced by David Chimhini, a ZimRights member and former employee of the
Zimbabwe Teachers Association.
Despite his dismissal as Secretary-General, Nick debele had remained a member of
ZimRights, and he had  returned as a paid employee of ZimRights, in 1994, working as
education officer until 1996.  When Tungwarara left, Ndebele applied for his job: “as the
second most senior employee” Ndebele felt that  he was the “obvious” successor to
Tungwarara.59  However, when asked in his interview how ZimRights should relate to the
CIO, Ndebele says he answered that it was best to make information available to the CIO, so
as to “clear misunderstandings.”60   Soon after this, a story appeared in the respected weekly
Financial Gazette saying that Ndebele had admitted to being a CIO agent, and the job went to
David Chimhini.
Ndebele lost his job as Education Officer with ZimRights the next year, when Ford
Foundation funding for the project expired.  But soon after, a new department for civic
education for community theatre, funded by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was opened and
therefore the new civic education officers were hired, who had both worked in the  Zimbabwe
Association of Community Theatre (ZACT).61   Ndebele claimed that the new director, David
Chimhini, had manufactured the move from Ford Foundation funding to the NPA project as
an excuse to get rid of him.  The claims that Ndebele was a CIO informant continue to
reverberate, despite an apology made by Reginald M tchaba-Hove for the rumour at the 1997
AGM.62  Many of Ndebele’s former close associates steered clear of him and concerted
efforts were made within the organization to prevent him holding an elected office at either
regional or national levels, though these proved unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, despite these internal conflicts,  ZimRights grew even more rapidly
under Chimhini’s guidance.  The numbers of staff more than doubled between 1996 and
1997, and then doubled again between 1997 and 1998.  Similarly, membership doubled from
a claimed 3000 in both October 199563 and April 1996,64 to 6 000 in May 1997,65 to 10 000
in 1997, and 14 000 in 1998.66  This growth served to exacerbate internal tensions further.
Unemployed, and smarting from rejections, Nick Ndebele had made no attempt to hide his
interest in either the Directorship or the Chairmanship.  He was unsuccessful in his bid to win
control of the Harare Regional Council in 1997 but was subsequently elected to represent
Harare on the National Council.67  In 1999, he was unexpectedly elected Chair of the
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Council.  When Reginald Matchaba-Hove resigned the Chair in 1999, the anti-Ndebele
faction felt sure that they had guaranteed the election of academic Charles Nhachi as Chair
and Paul Nyathi as Vice-Chair.68  Indeed, they have accused N ebele of unfairly influencing
‘naive, rural’ voters into voting for him as an anti-élite candidate.69
It was clear from the outset that, despite protestations to the contrary,  David
Chimhini, who had presided over Ndebele’s departure as education officer, would be unable
to work with Ndebele, and vice-versa. Ndebele began to articulate political positions which
were very much at odds with the attitudes of most other NGO élites. Influenced by a
particular strain of radical Africanism, he wrote a letter of support to President Mugabe over
Zimbabwe’s intervention into the Congo War.70  Similarly, he backed campaigns against the
white judges, who Mugabe was also attacking.71  He later  tried to pull ZimRights out of the
National Constitutional Assembly framework, just as it was squaring up to the government.72
At a time when politics in Zimbabwe was becoming more and more polarized, the closeness
of policy between ZimRights and the President’s pet projects was interpreted by observers as
complicity. Council members might not agree with statements being issued by N e ele, but
they had no formal sanction.  They were dispersed across the country and communication
with them was not always possible, nor was it feasible to arrange d-hoc meetings. Unlike
Matchaba-Hove, who was on the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Zimbabwe and
kept up a profitable private practice, Ndebele was unemployed or periodically self-employed
and quite prepared to become a full-time Chair.
Over the next months, the conflict between Ndebele and Chimhini degenerated into
rival allegations of sexual, financial and administrative misdeeds, carried out through the
press and the courts, as Ndebele first stage-managed Chimhini’s dismissal, and was later
forced to resign himself.73 The toll of this conflict was to be extremely damaging for
ZimRights, the organization. Staff members, caught in the middle of this conflict, fled to
more stable jobs.  Donors began removing their financial support soon after Ndebele’s
election as Chair, in response to letters from Chimhini.74 Lack of donor funds, and court
costs, forced ZimRights to sell its headquarters to settle its debts.75
Understanding ZimRights’ Collapse
ZimRight’s demise had a number of causes.  These included: a protracted and unequal
confrontation with the Zimbabwean state, the internal dynamics of the organization in a
setting where NGOs become a preferred source of employment for their ostensibly
‘volunteer’ members and the funds with which donors supplied it.  All of these factors should
lead us to be skeptical that NGOs – by virtue of their ‘voluntary’ nature – represent a panacea
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for donors trying to foster grass-roots advocacy as part of some larger governance or civil-
society project.
Even if one discounts assertions that ZimRights was the victim of CIO machinations,
the organization was in an isolated position throughout its brief existence.  Without the
protection of a larger body grounded in Zimbabwean society – the CCJP, for example, was
bolstered by its position within the Catholic Church – it had little protection when singled out
for attack.  ZimRights was also one of the only NGOs in Zimbabwe which occasionally used
Moyo’s oppositional tactics by issuing press releases and organizing demonstrations.  No
other Zimbabwean organization was so regularly attacked in the media by President Mugabe
and such pressures contributed to internal tensions and suspicions.  Yet, at the same time,
ZimRights’ only pro-active attempt to document human right abuses  – the Matabeleland
book – was initiated and carried through almost entirely by volunteer interns from the US,
Canada, and Sweden.
Perhaps even more crucially, the resources to which ZimRights had access made it a
site of even more determined contestation. Its objectives as an advocacy organization were
undermined by the job-creating and resource-distributing functions it came to serve.  For
example, one of the issues of conflict between David Chimhini and Nick Ndebele in 1999
was a proposal to remove sitting allowances for Council members and staff to attend
meetings.  This was a particular threat to those councilors who were unemployed, many of
whom were allied to, or sympathetic to the position of,  Ndebele who played a populist card
against the ‘élite’.
The intra-organizational  divisions are on one level merely a fight between two
disparate personalities and their factions, exacerbated by both sides’ willingness to use the
press to press their points.  Ndebele’s relation, Weston Kwete, became a reporter for the
explicitly pro-ZANU Sunday Mail and leaked  many of the anti-Chimhini stories. On the
other hand, the independent press did publish a vituperative exchange between Chimhini and
Matchaba-Hove on the one side versus Ndebele and the former ZimRights’ information
officer, with the dubious, but high-profile,  backing of  Jonathan Moyo.76
However, while this reveals the dangers implicit in hiring councillors as staff it also
reflects the ability of a large, professionalized secretariat to alienate membership.  Ndebele
has always described himself as the founder of ZimRights and feels that he deserved more
respect from the organization.  ZimRights under Chimhini’s leadership had gained a high
profile and large increases in donor funds, all of which had merely led to the organization
distancing itself from its roots.  Donors developed particularly good relations with Ch mhini,
who is articulate and speaks their language well.
This conflict between advocacy and employment was, ironically, aggravated by the
donor funding, upon which ZimRights came to depend.  Many donor-dependent
organizations go through similar explosive spurts of growth, often accompanied by crisis.
ZimRights was clearly a case of the ‘flavour of the month’ syndrome in that it was so popular
it rapidly raised money from multiple sources. While Oxfam is reported to have a rule that an
annual budget increase of more than 25% is likely to lead to organizational difficulties,77
ZimRights, in just one of the years studied, is reported to have multiplied its budget nearly
five-fold.78
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Whether or not NGOs are ‘naturally’ voluntary, the increased funding throughout the
1990s has made this claim less and less relevant. The collapse of ZimRights, at a time when
human rights observers were particularly needed is an extreme example. The people who
have lost out are the Zimbabweans, especially those displaced by the recent violence, who
have need of both documentation of their rights and protection from those abusing them.
ZimRights members too, still have great faith and hope in their organization.  Donors, on the
other hand,  have merely transferred their funds to other, perhaps equally vulnerable,
organizations.
IV. Pragmatic Decision-making
We can now turn to the implications of these multiple misunderstandings of how NGOs
function and how they relate to the state.  NGOs derive diverse benefits from their newly
increased roles.  While sceptics point to the material benefits of NGO careers – and these are
not insubstantial – we should not ignore the ‘immaterial’ yet substantive benefits which
churches and mosques have long recognized when they have gained converts through the
provision of health or education services.79  NGOs, like any organization, take pride in their
growth and high-profiles locally and internationally and senior positions in NGOs may bring
with them considerable public recognition.  There is also a potential down-side to the
‘profitability’ of the non-profit sector.  Entrepreneurs may also form NGOs to provide
employment, prestige and connections to the well-resourced development sector, rather than
for any commitment to abstract ideals advocated by donors.
In Zimbabwe, it is widely accepted that NGOs use non-confrontational tactics,
variously defined as  entryism and inclusion, to influence  various levels of state and party
apparatus.80 My research has focussed on the efforts of a few ‘activist’ NGOs to mobilize
their colleagues to lobby the government over three policy issues: economic structural
adjustment, legislation brought in to control the NGOs, and the Constitution.  In every one of
these cases, the activist NGOs met substantial obstacles.  Other NGOs were not interested,
were suspicious of their intentions, and preferred to use ‘non-confrontational’ methods or  to
work through government-approved channels for expressing discontent.81
Although the ‘beneficiaries’ of NGOs are often defined simply as those whom the
programmes are designed to benefit, the term should probably include the entire network that
relies upon NGO funding, such as employees and consultants.82  In some cases, this wider
group is seen as merely part of societal patronage networks.  Leaders of NGOs are thought to
seek to enhance their own prestige, rent-seeking potential, and client base.83   Such analyses
pathologize these NGOs for abandoning the voluntarist, altruistic goals of ‘real’ NGOs.  It
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seems more important to think critically about the political implications of such motivations
on the part of NGO staff, leaders and hangers-on.  How do the incentives to work for and
gain office in NGOs, the increased stakes in doing so, and the personal motivations of office-
holders influence the way in which NGOs and interest organizations interact with the state?
Where the state remains relatively administratively competent, typically,  all the
‘sticks’ — closure, deregistration, investigation and co-ordination — and ‘carrots’ — tax
exemption, access to policy-makers and public funding — are seen as emanating from the
state, while the NGOs have little, if any bargaining power.84  NGOs may therefore seek
access to the state to influence its policies as well as to avoid conflict or secure protection.85
As Fowler noted in his well-grounded study of Kenyan NGOs, “it appears that more can be
achieved by appearing to support, respect, and improve prevailing systems, rather than
openly agitating against them.”86  NGOs often initiate these interactions with states – and are
not always ‘co-opted’ by the state.   As development organizations, NGOs exercise strategic
pragmatism in order to ensure that their clients continue to benefit from the ‘goods’ they
bring.  Fowler’s thesis extends this point and emphasizes that “providing welfare services can
be an important factor allowing other, more politically sensitive, work to take place.”87  The
Undugu Society in Kenya, which both provides services to street-children and advocates for
policy reform, “pursues an emancipatory agenda through a managed mix of macro and micro
activities designed to reinforce each other so exploiting the limited development space that
exists and the opportunities which arise within it.”88  NGOs, therefore, may refrain from
political activity in order not to risk their primary goal but, at the same time, their role as
development organizations also enables them to press for certain policy changes. NGOs have
good reason to value harmonious relations with the state and cultural élites.  At the same
time, as NGOs become more professionalized, and are run by large staffs rather than by
volunteers, the interests of the staff may begin to predominate over those of the membership.
Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’ operates in NGOs as well as political parties.89
V. Conclusion: Pathologizing versus Romanticizing
My critique of the romanticization of NGOs in Africa has been one of several similar
projects. Amongst a plethora of writing on NGOs, a few significant studies which have
emerged from research based mostly in East Africa, deserve serious consideration.   Jim Igoe
and Greg Cameron, studying pastoralist NGOs in Tanzania,  emphasize the ways in which
donor agendas shape NGOs, and the multiple ways in which NGOs become little more than
new patronage vehicles for ‘big men’ in rural communities.90   In contrast, Tim Kelsall’s
study of NGO operations in north-eastern Tanzania, is more interested in the attempts of
NGOs to enhance communities’ abilities to undertake collective action.  Kelsall is profoundly
critical of the liberal development agenda of NGOs, but also questions the extent to which
they accomplish their ends.  In his account, the NGOs are unsuccessful in fostering
participation, accountability or democracy within the community because of the way in
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which they impose their agendas.91  Also concerned about ‘liberal development’, David
MacDermott Hughes’ very different methodology enables him to examine the interaction of
NGOs with local people in remote areas of Mozambique and Zimbabwe.  Hughes effectively
identifies not only the ways in which NGO-led participatory workshops marginalize local
peoples, but also their potential to eat away at land and resource entitlements of rural
groups.92
All of these recent studies suggest that we are right to be critical of claims and
assertions about NGO abilities: “there is no magic bullet.”93  Not only is there little evidence
that NGOs are either more efficient or more participatory than other development schemes,
but the exact opposite may be true.94   What Stewart calls the “NGOs do it cheaper, better
faster” argument seems to have little evidence backing it up.95  However, there is a new
danger of donors and academics falling out of love with NGOs and descending instead into
an equally problematic discourse which pathologizes NGOs, suggesting that they are nothing
more than new power resources for élites.  In the words of a recent, iconoclastic approach to
African Politics, NGOs are:
... a successful adaptation to the conditions laid down by foreign donors on
the part of local political actors who seek in this way to gain access to new
resources....NGOs are often nothing other than the new ‘structures’ with
which Africans can seek to establish an instrumentally profitable position
within the existing system of neo-patrimonialism....The use of NGO
resources can today serve the strategic interests of the classical
entrepreneurial Big man just as well as access to state coffer did in the past.96
While such an account may provide a useful balance to earlier effusions, its reluctance to take
NGO activists seriously betrays an equally limited approach.  The authors dismiss NGOs
summarily as merely saying what the donors want to hear, 97 which is more of an ad-hominem
attack than analytical reasoning or empirical evidence. While the romanticization of NGOs
needs reconsideration, so do approaches which conclude that they fail in all capacities.
Instead, NGOs need to be understood as organizations bound up in power relations on
various levels.
Studying both the organizational encumbrances of NGOs and their position within
the ideological sphere or political culture may help us explain their inter- and intra-
organizational decisions.  Situating NGOs within their political context and considering
internal processes avoids both the romanticization and the more recent pathologizing of
NGOs which dominate the literature.  Considering the continued weight placed upon NGOs
in donor discourses and funding, such an approach is not only timely, but necessary.
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Participant-observer research is a particularly valuable way of avoiding such
pathologizations.  After reading a particularly controversial case study – involving allegations
of sexual harassment, financial mismanagement, and government infiltration – one of my
informants said,
Your characterization of ZimRights seems on target...a few things are left
vague and unanswered, but maybe that is best after all.…..It is OK not to
have all the answers.  In some ways it really confirms the need to take a very
close look and use ‘thick description’.  If you had done an organizational
analysis from a macro perspective, none of these scandals would even come
up on the radar screen – and they really tell a big part of the story as far as
ZimRights is concerned.98
Understanding intra- and inter-organizational dynamics as a participant-observer enables the
researcher to make sense out of apparently incongruous evidence and guards against
tendencies to romanticization and pathologization of NGOs.
This suggests a need to reconsider the methodological and theoretical basis of
‘democratization' . The understanding of democratization as a re-configuration of state and
society relations in a series of very different and complex post-colonial societies should affect
our choice of research techniques.  Whitehead notes in a significant re-assessment of the
interaction between theory and empirical research on democratization: “the best and perhaps
the only, way to grasp the dynamics of a long-term open-ended process is through narrative-
construction.”99   If we  conceptualize democratization “as a complex, dynamic, long-term
and open-ended process...then the type of theory-building and hypothesis-testing that would
be possible and appropriate...would be interpretative rather than demonstrative.”100  This
brings us back to a more Weberian social science,  where the purpose of research is   “
interpretative understanding of social action...and causal explanation of its course and
consequences.”101
Complex and dynamic processes are best studied using a multiplicity of
methodological tools.  Interview research, participant-observation, and  documentary
evidence reinforce each other and reflect different aspects of the process under study.
Organizations like NGOs benefit from being studied from the ‘inside' so as to generate ‘thick
description' and capture their internal decision-making processes. Documentary evidence
enables the study of changes within discourses.  Interview research is a necessary, if not
sufficient, tool for clarifying information, and allowing the subjects of the study to speak
directly to the topic. Together, these methods provide the material through which we can
construct historical narratives that enable  understanding and explanation.
We need to present a much more complex and historicized vision of the role played
by NGOs and churches in state-society politics.  Yet at the same time, we must avoid
demonizing or otherwise dismissing as ‘un-African’ those political actors keen on reform or
who work for NGOs.  These are important lessons for academics and the donor fraternity,
many of whom either accept at face value teleological narratives of democratization (and are
then baffled by the lack of ‘democracy’ in post-transition societies), or see Africa’s political
cultures as irredeemably collapsing into chaos.
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